Portland State University

PDXScholar
Young Historians Conference

Young Historians Conference 2014

Apr 29th, 10:30 AM - 11:45 AM

Upholding the Monroe Doctrine: American Foreign
Policy in the 1954 Guatemalan Coup d'Etat
Nadjalisse C. Reynolds-Lallement
Lakeridge High School

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/younghistorians
Part of the Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Reynolds-Lallement, Nadjalisse C., "Upholding the Monroe Doctrine: American Foreign Policy in the 1954
Guatemalan Coup d'Etat" (2014). Young Historians Conference. 13.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/younghistorians/2014/oralpres/13

This Event is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Young Historians
Conference by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

UPHOLDING THE MONROE DOCTRINE: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1954
GUATEMALAN COUP D’ETAT

Nadjalisse C. Reynolds-Lallement

Dr. Karen E. Hoppes
HST 201: US History
June 5, 2013

UPHOLDING THE MONROE DOCTRINE: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1954
GUATEMALAN COUP D’ETAT

In June 1954, the American CIA collaborated with a small army of Latin America exiles
to depose the democratic administration of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. In a few
short weeks, the United States covertly, almost casually, took advantage of its military influence
in order to dramatically change the future of an entire nation of people. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
the then-president of the United States, was commander-in-chief of an administration that felt
that it had the right, even the duty, to drastically alter the lives of millions of Guatemalans, just
as in past foreign interventions conducted by the US.
As William Appleman Williams bemusedly proclaimed in his article “The Frontier
Thesis and American Foreign Policy”, “One of the central themes of American historiography is
that there is no American Empire.”1 However, strong themes of American imperialism permeate
all of American history: Western expansion of the frontier, claiming land from Mexico in the
early nineteenth century, attempting to win Canadian land in the War of 1812, intervening in Iran
through covert operations in 1953, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Whether for purposes of
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expansion, control of resources, or ideological manipulation, the United States had established a
strong foreign policy of intervention and imperialism by the mid-twentieth century.
The United States played such a heavy role in the Guatemalan coup that effectively,
Jacobo Arbenz was “overthrown by the United States in June 1954,” as Piero Gleijeses,
professor of US Foreign Policy and Latin American Studies at Johns Hopkins University, wrote
simply and emphatically.2 In ousting another country’s fair and democratic government through
the use of military force in order to install a new military government more sympathetic to
American interests, Eisenhower merely extended the United States’ long pattern of imperialistic
action. Economic imperialism motivated the Guatemalan coup to some extent because American
corporations heavily depended on Latin American resources, but largely, the coup in Guatemala
was a product of ideological imperialism: part of the United States’ ongoing quest for control
over the entirety of the Western Hemisphere, a quest that had defined American foreign policy
since James Monroe delivered the nationally groundbreaking Monroe Doctrine in his seventh
annual message to Congress.
The Monroe Doctrine stated that “the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a
principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American
continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power.”3
The message was clear: according to the wishes of the United States, North and South America
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were to remain under their own jurisdiction, without threat of European imperialism. However,
as the issuer of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States also set itself up to be the gatekeeper of
the Western hemisphere, a duty to which it religiously adhered, even when it came to Cold Warera Guatemala.
At the time of the US-orchestrated Guatemalan coup d’etat, the international community
was at its height of Cold War tension and hysteria, and the United States was one of its most
powerful and determined members. Desperate to stifle Soviet and Communist influence in its
neighbors, the Eisenhower administration was constantly prepared to resort to drastic measure to
curb Communist expansion and, by perceived corollary, thereby defend democracy and freedom.
Communism was heavily demonized by Americans as an arm of evil and oppression; mentions
of “the Communist menace” ran rampant through public discourse. Though the USSR was not
European, the United States upheld the same foreign policy principle that it had maintained since
the Monroe Doctrine: the Americas were not to be interfered with by anyone other than the
United States. As a result, the Eisenhower administration justified its “defending” Guatemala and
the entirety of the Western Hemisphere against Soviet-propagated ideological imperialism with
its own show of ideological imperialism. E. Howard Hunt, a CIA professional involved in
Guatemalan intelligence leading up to the coup, shared his view of the situation in Guatemala
and the relevance of the Monroe Doctrine in a 1999 interview:
My attention was soon directed to the apparent
violations of the Monroe Doctrine, or the coming
violations of the Monroe Doctrine, by Guatemala,
by the government of Arbenz… Eventually, an
officer of lower rank than myself came down to say,
"Well, you know, why don't you cool it - there's no
particular interest in what's going on in Guatemala."
And I said, "Well, I don't think that's the thing to
do," I said, "because we're faced here with the
obvious intervention of a foreign power, because
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these home-grown parties are not really homegrown, they're being funded or advised by a foreign
power - i.e. the Soviet Union.4
The United States believed that Guatemala was turning into a Soviet outpost in the
United States and therefore an ideological and national security threat to the United States. In
1954, two days after the coup, an article in the New York Times proclaimed that “Washington
fears the Communists might succeed in taking over Guatemala and using it as a beachhead to
infiltrate other Latin-American nations and the vital Panama Canal Zone.”5 Another newspaper
from earlier in the year also cited the national security dangers of Communist influence in
Guatemala, claiming:
The real problem of communism in Guatemala is
not a Communist revolt or seizure of executive
power. It is the progressive nourishment of a
thriving Communist community already healthy
enough to heckle, goad, sting, and constantly harass
the United States in accord with the wishes of the
Soviet Union.6
The same newspaper also described the ideological dangers that the United States
perceived in Guatemala:
The Communist menace here is…a bustling outpost
of Soviet propaganda right in the hear of the
Americas….Guatemala is being transformed by an
international Communist effort into a thorn in the
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flank of the Western Hemisphere. How to get it out
before infection starts is a tough problem.7
The United States, in the midst of the heavily ideological Cold War, feared that majority
Communism would begin in Guatemala but spread to its neighbors throughout the rest of the
Western hemisphere. Rather than allow other countries influence in the Western hemisphere, the
United States took it upon itself to undo ten years of progressive political, economic, and social
development in Guatemala by orchestrating a hare-brained coup.
In 1944, the country of Guatemala went through a series of dramatic shifts in
government, all motivated by the people’s desire to move toward a more democratic
government.8 The so-called “October Revolution” eventually saw self-proclaimed “spiritual
socialist” Juan José Arévalo installed as the first democratically elected President of Guatemala.9
Arévalo’s radically different ideology incited a period of national reform in Guatemala that
included securing basic rights for workers through the creation of a Labor Code that mandated
minimum pay policy as well as some unionization protection.10 This reformation also, and
eventually most significantly, spawned the revision of the nation’s land distribution policy. In
general these reforms did not significantly affect the daily lives of the Guatemalan people, but
they gradually prompted the government of the United States to sit up and take notice of this
small Latin American country and its radical president.
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Despite the relative success of Arévalo’s presidency, political turmoil continued to rip the
nation’s government into a conservative right-wing faction, headed by Army Colonel Francisco
Arana, and another more liberal political group eventually represented by Defense Minister
Jacobo Arbenz.11 Both men were nationally recognized military and political figures who had
aided in the removal of Arévalo’s predecessor in the October Revolution of 1944; now, they vied
for the leadership of the socially stratified, politically swaying country.
Just over a year before the next presidential election in Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz and
President Arévalo together coordinated the attempted interception of Francisco Arana. On June
18, 1949, a group of armed soldiers detained Arana during his travel to the city of El Morlón. A
gunfight ensued, and Arana was killed; President Arevalo later attributed the assassination to the
“conservative opposition” to his own government, and public speculation blamed political
supporters of Arbenz.12 Whether or not the assassination was purposeful or accidental remains
unknown, but either way, it was to Arbenz’s political benefit.13
Shortly thereafter, Arbenz held the support of President Arévalo, who recognized
Arbenz’s commitment to Guatemalan economic and political reform.14 He also gained the
backing of a significant portion of the Guatemalan military as well as tentative support from
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Guatemala’s workers and lower classes, who hoped for social reform to result from his
presidency.15
Jacobo Arbenz succeeded Arévalo as President of Guatemala in March 1951. Arévalo’s
presidency had been “marked by the unprecedented existence of a multi-party system, by the
development of urban trade systems, and by nearly unfettered freedom of the press;” even so,
during his term, "illiterate women could not vote,” “the Communist Party was proscribed,” and
“trade unionism in the country was severely restricted.”16 Though the country had made great
strides in democratic reform under Arévalo, Arbenz faced the continuing task of enacting land
distribution reform to the benefit of Guatemalan industry.17 At the time of his ascension,
Guatemalan industry was suffering. Guatemala was a “banana republic”, its unstable economy
dependent on a few main export crops largely mediated by American corporations. As a result,
American corporations controlled much of the country’s economy and farmland, and most of
Guatemala’s cultivatable land rested in the hands of a tiny percentage of the population, little of
it ever actually being put to use.18
Firmly nationalist, one of Arbenz’s goals was to increase Guatemala’s self-sufficiency
and economic prosperity; in his inaugural address, Arbenz stated that the goals of his
administration would be, “to convert Guatemala from a country bound by a predominantly feudal
economy into a modern, capitalist one.”19 One year into his term, he made several strides toward
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achieving this in the form of Decree 900, a radical agrarian reform bill.20 Decree 900 confiscated
unused farmland from large plantations and redistributed the land to the Guatemalan people.
President Arbenz’s reform bill made perfect sense from a nationalist perspective in that it
gave Guatemalans the resources that they needed in order to prosper while reducing foreign
corporate control. However, the land bill also aggravated American-based corporations that
were suddenly faced with the seizure and redistribution of thousands of acres of their unused
land. First Arévalo had empowered the workers that the companies exploited on their
plantations; then Arbenz was calmly expropriating their land in Guatemala. Unsurprisingly,
these reform movements eventually raised a few eyebrows in the Eisenhower administration.
Though Arbenz was clearly not communist and, in fact, often criticized the communist
ideology, Guatemala contained a small yet growing communist party.21 American and Soviet
tension at the time had fostered an intense anti-communist agenda within the United States. In
the midst of Guatemalan reforms that threatened American economic giants and bolstered the
leftist ideology, the Eisenhower administration trained a wary eye on Arbenz and his
government, all the while biased by Cold War-era prejudices.22
The United Fruit Company, or UFCO, was a corporation that was particularly
instrumental in attacking the actions of the Guatemalan government. UFCO held a considerable
19
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amount of Guatemalan land – almost 1.5 million acres – overlorded a significant portion of the
Guatemalan workforce, and held a dangerous amount of sway in Guatemala’s economy.23 In
1950, renowned Argentinean poet Pablo Neruda denounced the role of “parallel government”
that American corporations filled in Guatemala and other so-called banana republics. In his
1950 poem “La United Fruit Co.”, Neruda described the United Fruit Company’s reign in
Central America:
It rebaptized these countries
Banana Republics,
and over the sleeping dead,
over the unquiet heroes
who won greatness,
liberty, and banners,
it established an opera buffa:
it abolished free will,
gave out imperial crowns,
encouraged envy, attracted
the dictatorships of flies…
Carias flies, Martinez flies,
Ubico flies…wise flies
expert at tyranny.24
The United Fruit Company had previously supported the kind of dictatorial, highly
socially stratified society that would allow the company free reign in the Guatemalan economy
and an inexpensive labor supply. However, UFCO was one of the companies most dramatically
affected by Arbenz’s agrarian land reform bill, thousands of acres of their land being
expropriated and redistributed Guatemalans.25 Despite being awarded over $600,000 in return
23
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for unused land expropriated under Arbenz’s agrarian reform bill, UFCO lobbied the US State
Department in an attempt to gain further compensation.26 Whether or not as a result of many
State Department officials’ close financial ties with the United Fruit Company, the United States
government submitted a formal legal claim against the Arbenz administration in April 1954
demanding an extra $15 million in recompense to be paid to the economic giant.27
The Arbenz administration understandably refused the State Department’s demands.
Some historians claim that the pleas of the United Fruit Company were what ultimately drew the
Eisenhower administration into condemnation of Arbenz; others attribute tension to suspected
involvement with the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, as consistent with the latest
official statement by the United States.28 Regardless, as of 1954, strained relations existed
between the American and Guatemalan governments.
These strained relations were reflected in United States public perception of the
Guatemalan government and people at the time, a perception fueled by the media but created by
the United States Central Intelligence Agency. In the years leading up to the CIA intervention in
Guatemala, the CIA and US Department of State collaborated with representatives of the United
Fruit Company to distort public image of the Guatemalan people and inflate perception of
communist influence in Guatemala. Certain investigative reporters were mysteriously deflected
from the issue, and dubious information was supplied as if it were fact, among other
propagandist strategies described by professor of Political Science and International Relations
Gordon L. Bowen:
26
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the CIA and United Fruit [UFCO] helped plant
unsubstantiated stories in the American press about
Soviet arms turning up in Guatemala. Indeed, Fruit
Company-sponsored information constituted a near
monopoly of the sources used in American press
reports about Guatemala in this era. U.S.
Information Service documents show that even
within Guatemala much of the Latin American
comment on the ‘red menace’ in Guatemala which
was reprinted from Chilean and other ‘credible’
Latin American sources was, in fact, originally
written by CIA officers.29
US newspapers from the early 1950s were rife with gruesome portrayals of a communistoverrun Guatemala. Newspaper articles from before the Guatemalan coup fed the public stories
of the Communist Party being “the most important party” in Guatemala. These articles insisted
that communists had “succeeded in capturing the [Arbenz] administration” because President
Arbenz was “permit[ting] their dominance.”30 In reality, the Communist Party of Guatemala (El
Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) seems to have held very little influence in Arbenz’s
administration. Having no source of correct information, however, the people of the United
States – if they thought about the subject at all – continued to believe that Arbenz and his fellow
radicals “were hampered by inexperience, lack of democratic tradition or organization and the
opposition of the great, rich landowners,” and so gave communists “ever more power and
influence.”31
The people of Guatemala were also portrayed by the United States media to be feeble and
incompetent, puppets in the hands of sardonic, cunning communists. While reporters described
29
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foreign dissent with gusto – the bitterness of the authoritarian governments of neighboring Latin
American countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras that feared similar democratic reforms in
their countries as well as the righteous American concern about the prospect of a communist
outpost in the Western Hemisphere – Guatemalan citizens were viewed as apathetic, helpless,
and apolitical in the face of an unstable government aggressively veering toward leftist politics.
In a New York Times article from early 1954, before the coup, reporter Sydney Gruson wrote as
if it were indisputable fact that “The great masses of people of the region [Latin America] are not
concerned over communism or, in fact, any other ideology, including democracy, as it is
understood by the Western world. They are so poor that the problems of feeding and housing
occupy all their time.”32 Here, Gruson employed an imperialistic perspective consistent with
Maslow’s infamous hierarchy of needs, degrading the intelligence and competence of every
Guatemalan citizen. He insinuated that Guatemalans could not even comprehend “democracy, as
it is understood by the Western world,” as if Latin America was so inferior that it could not even
be regarded as part of the Western hemisphere despite its geography.
This attitude of intellectual and innovative superiority has been seen time and time again
in instances of imperialism, from Christopher Columbus’s wretched enslavement of the
inhabitants of Hispaniola in the late fifteenth century to Belgian occupation of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo hundreds of years later. The American public and government were set
up to believe that the Guatemalan people could not take care of themselves in their own country
against a threat identified only by American political hysteria, and therefore, in June 1954, the
CIA under the Eisenhower administration felt that they were justified in bringing Guatemala’s
autonomous, democratic government to its knees. After all, Guatemalan Communists were “in
32

"Central America Feels Communist Pressure: But Party Seems to Have Little Success
Except in Guatemala”.
13

control of the labor unions, the Government’s radio and newspaper propaganda organs and other
key jobs,” as far as the public knew.33
Anti-Guatemalan sentiment permeated the United States with the help of UFCO lobbyists
as well as suspicious politicians.34 It is difficult to discern the Eisenhower administration’s true
motivations for moving into its next stage of Guatemalan manipulation because of the sheer
rapidity of the operation.35 Following the coattails of a purportedly successful CIA intervention
in Iran as well as constant whining on the part of the United Fruit Company, members of
President Dwight Eisenhower’s cabinet made the official decision to act against Arbenz in
August of 1953.36 Recorded in a memorandum to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, it
was stated that “During the past year the Government of Guatemala and Communist elements
within that country have strengthened their position,” and that despite some ragtag revolutionary
movements in Guatemala, it was “improbable that the Arbenz Government can be successfully
countered without direct military action in which revolutionary forces must have outside aid.”37
The CIA was directed to “Through covert channels, supply RUFUS [Colonel Castillo Armas]
with all the arms, planes and money required for a successful operation, providing the review of
his assets is positive.”
33
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http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d41; Internet.
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Operation PBFORTUNE was the first official stage of the Guatemalan coup d’etat
attributed to the United States. Beginning as early as in February 1952, the CIA created a
classified list of “Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military
Operations” through assassination, imprisonment, or exile.38 Under President Truman, the CIA
planned to supply right-wing Guatemalan rebels with necessary equipment and supplies to take
down the Arbenz administration. In a memorandum to the Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA,
an undisclosed official reported that:
Armed action against the [Guatemalan] government
has been planned and pending since early this year
and is now imminent. Details of the plan for such
action, which follows through to the establishment
of a democratic government, are known to us.
[name not declassified] considers that if proper
support can be provided the plan is feasible and
practical and has a good chance of succeeding if it
is put in effect by 1 September 1952.39
The rest of the memorandum recommended that “support with arms and equipment” and
“financial support in the amount of $225,000 be provided” to Col. Castillo Armas in order to
secure the overthrowing of President Arbenz’s government. However, the operation was not
allowed to begin because the CIA could not obtain sufficient evidence of communist exploits or
national security threats in Guatemala.40
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At the time, the American public was led to believe that Guatemala posed a national
security threat to the United States through its support of Soviet-bolstered principles and
promotion of vaguely leftist programs such as Arbenz’s agrarian reform bill.41 The idea of
Guatemala being a communist enemy was not difficult to foist onto the American people during
this period of constant hysteria and suspicion.42
In fact, the next stage of foreign intervention by the United States was born of the
aforesaid hysteria and unfounded suspicion, and it was just as readily accepted as the mediapropagated idea of Guatemala being a threat to the Western hemisphere. In an unfounded and
unspeakably cruel maneuver, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency of the
United States collaborated with right-wing military rebels in Guatemala to destroy Arbenzand his
reform movements.43 The intervention, dubbed Operation PBSUCCESS, strove to force
President Arbenz to resign and turn leadership of the country over to the Guatemalan military.44
Though the United States claimed to be protecting democracy in the Western Hemisphere
through bringing down Arbenz, the CIA’s plan clearly entailed measures to ensure the deposition
of the democratically elected leader of Guatemala who brought economic change and social
reform to the country.45 They planned to place Guatemala under military control that would
instead stifle the lower classes, and this was somehow America’s idea of necessary and
beneficial foreign intervention in the 1950s.
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The American government justified the intervention in Guatemala in several ways. The
most public and compelling of these arguments was the ideological: the CIA truly interpreted
the perceived (though barely existent) Communist influence in Jacobo Arbenz’s government as a
legitimate threat to the national security of the United States. Duane Clarridge, chief of the Latin
America division of the CIA, described the nature of the alleged threat to the United States in the
following manner:
Now to me what happened with the Cold War was,
it wasn't so much you were gonna have somebody
come over and invade a country, the Soviets weren't
gonna come over and invade a Latin American
country, what you were gonna have is their covert
action apparatus create a situation where you have a
government come to power in x, y and z country
which is favorable to them to one degree or another,
and then they will begin to either exert influence in
that country and you get a domino effect where we
have other countries begin to follow that, or they set
up bases.46

Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas led the Guatemalan side of the coup d’etat, the two
hundred-odd band of undertrained mercenaries that comprised the so-called Liberation Forces.47
Armas was a well-known figure and recently-exiled opponent of Arbenz and his politics. Given
the full political and military support of the CIA, Armas became able to take control of the
government of Guatemala with the help of a small army of CIA-trained and armed mercenaries.
In January 1954, news of Operation PBSUCCESS was leaked to the public, but the information

46
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hardly caused a stir.48 The US State Department denied involvement in Colonel Castillo Armas’
military plan, saying:
The Department of State has today received a
summary of the statement issued yesterday by the
Presidential Information Office of Guatemala
charging that the U.S. Government had acquiesced
in a plot by other nations against Guatemala. The
charge is ridiculous and untrue. It is the policy of
the United States not to intervene in the internal
affairs of other nations. That policy has repeatedly
been reaffirmed under the pi'esent administration.49
Planning of Operation PBSUCCESS continued to proceed normally.
In May 1954, the United States Navy hastened the start of Operation PBSUCCESS by
blockading Guatemalan ports, intercepting and searching Guatemalan ships, and purportedly
searching for evidence of communism-motivated aggression on the part of the small Latin
American country.50 Colonel Armas disseminated rightist propaganda among Guatemalan
citizens, leading Arbenz to crack down on government protests and opposition.51
Finally, on June 18, 1954, Colonel Castillo Armas and his army of mercenaries invaded
Guatemala and almost immediately fell to defeat at the hands of the Guatemalan Army.52 480
mercenaries were certainly not adequately strong to overthrow the government of a sovereign
nation through military force; however, Arbenz faced the tactical threat of United States support
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49
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.txt; Internet.
51
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for the Liberation Army.53 In fact, Piero Gleijeses claimed that Arbenz eventually stepped down
not because of internal dissent and protest, but because of fear of United States invasion and
occupation.54
Ultimately, the Guatemalan coup d’etat represented a steep political divide in the nation,
but it was the threat of United States occupation that drove President Arbenz to resign.55 After a
brief counter-revolution, on Sunday, June 27, Arbenz resigned from the presidency of
Guatemala.56
Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas took control of the nation, much to the consternation of
much of the Guatemalan population.57 Upper-class landowners certainly did not bemoan the
demise of Decree 900 and the land redistribution that it implied.58 However, in a society in
which prosperity depended on agriculture, and therefore the availability of land, Arbenz’s land
reform bill had made beginnings in striving for equality in Guatemala.59 Armed protests and
demonstrations fought against Castillo Armas’ government, but the government was led by a
succession of military juntas that fostered a society of corruption, oppression, and civil warfare.60
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Everything that Arevalo and Arbenz had worked for since the October Revolution a decade
previously was essentially destroyed in the space of a few days due to Operation PBSUCCESS.61
Despite the gross injustice and unwarranted interference of the CIA intervention in
Guatemala, the event sparked extremely little notice outside of Guatemala. While violent
protests raged through the streets in Guatemala as the country fell once more to elite-sympathetic
dictatorship, the rest of the world only remained politely concerned as they watched from a
distance. The role of the CIA in fueling the coup was long-concealed from the American people
and from most of the American government.
The Eisenhower administration was able to orchestrate the coup very quickly through the
decisions and input of a very small number of people by hiding the operation from both Congress
and the American public, but lack of informed response on the part of the international
community and the United Nations left the Eisenhower administration unchecked in their abuse
of power and international supremacy – supremacy that resulted in another case of American
imperialism.62
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